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Those who maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be 
reduced to, identified with, or analyzed in terms of natural properties have 
diﬃculty explaining what these properties are. Stephen Finlay characterizes 
the problem in the following passage:
On the nonnaturalists’ view … reality has ‘brute, inexplicable’ normativity, which 
cannot be explained in motivational or other natural terms. This inexplicability is 
twofold: we cannot explain what normativity is in nonnormative language, and 
neither can we explain why the fundamental normative truths hold (e.g., why the 
fact that pain hurts counts in favor of preventing it).
(Finlay 2007: 24)
I have argued elsewhere that no metaethical theory—naturalist, 
non-naturalist, or otherwise—can explain why the fundamental norma-
tive truths hold (Heathwood 2012). In this chapter, I attempt to address 
the other “inexplicability problem” for normative non-naturalism: that of 
explaining what normativity is in non-normative language. I don’t claim 
to be giving a complete characterization of normativity in non-normative 
terms, such as an identification of normativity with some natural phenome-
non. To do that would presumably be to abandon non-naturalism. Instead, 
I put forward a substantive thesis about normative properties that, if true, 
goes some way towards elucidating their nature in non-normative terms.
At a first pass, the view is this:
normative properties are those such that, to attribute one to some-
thing is, in virtue of the nature of the property attributed, necessarily 
to commend or condemn that thing.
It characterizes normativity in terms of the natural phenomenon of per-
forming certain familiar speech acts. The idea is that in merely reporting 
some of the facts of the world, we can’t help but get ourselves involved in 
the further business of evaluating—of commending, recommending, con-
demning, and so forth—when the facts that we are reporting are among 
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the normative facts of the world. And this is due not to any contingent 
practices or conventions of ours (beyond whatever is required to make the 
assertion and attribute the property), but to the nature of the property we 
have attributed.
In what follows, I further explain the initial problem and provide addi-
tional background (section 9.1); I clarify and refine the proposed solution 
(section 9.2); I address some objections (section 9.3); and I describe further 
explanatory work that the hypothesis can do, both for the non-naturalist 
and more generally (section 9.4). Our topic includes normative facts nar-
rowly construed—as when someone ought to do something—as well as 
evaluative facts—as when some state of aﬀairs would be good in itself. For 
simplicity, I group both under the label “normative.” The thesis is meant to 
cover both “positive” normative facts, as in the above examples, as well as 
“negative” cases, such as when someone has a reason against doing some-
thing or when some outcome would be intrinsically bad. I’ll often speak 
only of one or the other of the positive or negative cases, even when what 
I say applies to both. Since these “thin” normative notions will be enough 
to occupy us, I set aside discussion of how the theory might be extended to 
so-called thick evaluatives.
It is not my aim here to be giving positive arguments for the existence 
and instantiation of irreducibly normative properties. It is rather to be oﬀer-
ing a theory about what such properties would be like. The view is supposed 
to enable non-naturalists to deflect an objection to or complaint about their 
theory: that the theory posits a class of properties whose natures are myste-
rious and ineﬀable. However, as we will see, critics of non-naturalism can 
accept the account too, even as part of an argument against non-naturalism.
9.1 A PROBLEM FOR NORMATIVE 
NONNATURALISM: WHAT IS NORMATIVITY 
OR VALUE?
According to normative non-reductionism, there are normative properties 
and facts—facts such as that people ought to be more kind or that the world 
would be better if people were—and these facts are sui generis: that is, they 
are not identical to any facts that we can express or adequately understand 
using terms from some other domain. This view has appeal. For surely there 
are some normative facts, such as the examples above, and it doesn’t seem, 
at least prima facie, that when we assert some such fact, we are stating a fact 
that we could just as well state using non-normative language—as when, in 
stating that the earth is covered in water, we could just as well state that fact 
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in chemical terms, by saying that the earth is covered in H2O. The fact that 
people ought to be more kind does not at least appear to be the same fact 
as any fact expressible in non-normative terms, such as that people would 
be motivated to be more kind if they had full information, or that people’s 
being more kind would increase preference satisfaction. Rather, the norma-
tive facts about any situation would seem to be further facts about it, and 
the properties they involve thus irreducibly normative.
Non-naturalists hold, further, that these sui generis normative facts are 
themselves not natural facts about the world. In saying that, they usually 
mean one or more of the following: that the facts are not causally eﬃca-
cious, that they are not discoverable wholly empirically, or that they are 
not the sorts of facts the natural sciences investigate. These claims also seem 
reasonable. Normative facts don’t seem observable with the senses, even 
indirectly, nor required to causally explain any non-normative events in 
the world.
I am here just remarking on the initial appearances, not on the ulti-
mate truth of the matter. For these initially plausible views face well-known 
problems. Non-naturalists, for example, have diﬃculty explaining how we 
can come to know normative facts, or even grasp normative properties, if 
these facts and properties don’t interact causally with our brains. And all 
non-reductionists have diﬃculty explaining why the normative facts cannot 
vary independently from the non-normative facts, given their view that the 
normative facts are further facts about any situation.
Reductive naturalists, who hold that normative facts are identical to cer-
tain natural facts with which we are already familiar, appear to have an 
easier time explaining normative knowledge and supervenience. Reductive 
naturalists avoid another problem as well: that of saying what normative 
properties are, or of explaining the nature of normativity or value. Their 
reductionism delivers this automatically. To illustrate, according to a sim-
ple reductive hedonism, the property of being intrinsically good just is the 
property of being a state of pleasure; and according to a simple Humean 
theory of reasons, to have a reason to do something just is to be motivated 
to do it. These reductive theses tell us, respectively, what intrinsic value and 
normative reasons are.1
Since non-naturalists resist any identification of these phenomena with 
any natural phenomena, they have diﬃculty saying what their irreducibly 
normative properties are, or are like. They can say what they are not like: 
they are not causally eﬃcacious; they are not empirically discoverable. But 
1 I am not suggesting that reductive naturalism has an easier time giving a correct or 
satisfying account here, just that, unlike non-reductionism, it comes with a ready-made 
answer to our question.
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we’d like to know something by way of positive characterization. For one 
thing, these negative characterizations don’t distinguish irreducibly nor-
mative properties from other potentially non-natural properties, such as 
modal, mathematical, or logical properties.
By way of positive characterization, non-naturalists typically simply 
repeat the normative notions we were wanting some account of, and con-
cede that no other kind of positive characterization is possible. G. E. Moore 
writes:
If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of 
the matter. Or if I am asked ‘How is good to be defined?’ my answer is that it cannot 
be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. (1903: §6)2
Derek Parfit is similarly resigned to accepting the inexplicability:
If words like ‘reason’ and ‘ought’ neither refer to natural features, nor express our 
attitudes, what could they possibly mean? Non-reductive realists, as I have con-
ceded, do not give helpful answers to these questions. (2006: 330)
More recently, Parfit acknowledges that this opens his view up to the objec-
tion we are considering here:
I admit that, when I say that we have some reason, or that we should or ought to 
act in a certain way, what I mean cannot be helpfully explained in other terms … 
Williams suggests that the phrase ‘has a reason’ does not have any such intelligible, 
irreducibly normative … sense. When he discusses statements about such … rea-
sons, Williams calls these statements ‘mysterious’ and ‘obscure’, and suggests that 
they mean nothing. Several other writers make similar claims.3 (2011: 272)
I hope to oﬀer something to blunt the complaint that irreducibly norma-
tive properties are wholly mysterious and obscure. Now, I cannot deny that 
some mystery and obscurity will remain even if my view is correct. And of 
course other problems, such as concerning knowledge and supervenience, 
will remain. But I believe the proposal here makes for some measure of pro-
gress in explaining the nature of normativity on the non-naturalist view.4
2 By “What is good?,” Moore surely means, What is goodness? He of course has sub-
stantive, informative answers to the question, What things are good?
3 Williams asks, “if [an agent] becomes persuaded of this supposedly [irreducibly nor-
mative] truth [that he has a reason to do a certain thing], what is it that he has come to 
believe?” (Williams 1995 [1989]: 39). And as Finlay notes, “many philosophers remain 
unsatisfied with the thought that normativity might be brute and inexplicable” (Finlay 
2010: 8).
4 One might wonder to what extent this problem for non-naturalism is also a problem 
for other forms of non-reductionism, especially non-reductive naturalism (the view that, 
while normative properties cannot be analyzed non-normatively, they are themselves nat-
ural properties). For reasons that I lack the space to explain, I believe that the complaint 
does apply to non-reductive naturalism, but less acutely.
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9.2 A SOLUTION: IRREDUCIBLY  
NORMATIVE PROPERTIES AS ESSENTIALLY 
COMMENDATORY PROPERTIES
We use words to describe reality, but we do many other things with them as 
well. By uttering certain words in the right context, we can thank someone, 
make an oﬀer, condemn an act. Speech acts are a familiar, natural phenome-
non. Also familiar is that sometimes, in performing a speech act of a certain 
kind, we thereby perform another speech act. If I say, “I have a car,” I have 
described reality as being a certain way; I have performed a description. If 
certain other things are true of the circumstances—for example, if you had 
just said, “I need a ride to the store”—then, in saying, “I have a car,” I might 
also be oﬀering you a ride. In simply describing things as being a certain 
way, I can also make an oﬀer.
Typically, and perhaps even in all other cases, which other speech 
acts, if any, a person performs in performing a description requires the 
existence of certain background conditions beyond whatever is required 
to make the description. The semantic meaning of the assertion is not 
enough to give rise to other kinds of speech act. But what is interesting 
about normative properties, I claim, is that if a person attributes one 
to something, thus performing a description, she can’t help but also be 
commending or condemning the thing. Normative and evaluative prop-
erties, if irreducible, have this special feature: if someone says sincerely 
that something in the world has one of these properties, she, of necessity, 
due to the nature of these properties, rather than due to background 
conventions and other conditions, involves herself in more than mere 
description of the world. The nature of the property is such that it makes 
her commend or condemn, praise or criticize, speak positively or nega-
tively, speak for or against. The properties are at once descriptive—as, 
trivially, any genuine property must be—and evaluative. We can charac-
terize this as the view of normative properties as essentially commenda-
tory properties.
This hypothesis, if true, should go some way towards assuaging critics of 
non-naturalism who are mystified as to what these irreducibly normative 
properties are supposed to be. We are all familiar with commending and 
condemning; we all do it, no matter our metaethical predilections. These 
irreducibly normative properties are interesting, according to our hypothe-
sis, because they are inherently such as to make us do it, whether we want to 
or not, whenever we merely attribute one to something. That is something 
substantive and interesting about their nature; it distinguishes them from 
non-normative properties; and it distinguishes them from other properties 
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whose nature and existence is contested in philosophy, such as modal, mental, 
mathematical, and logical properties.
To be sure, the claim is not that normative properties are such that if some-
thing has one, we ought to commend or condemn it. Such a thesis would 
not be characterizing normativity non-normatively. Nor is the claim that 
commending—a contingent, interest-relative practice of human beings—itself 
forms part of the nature of a putatively objective, stance-independent property. 
The normative properties don’t themselves commend; only people can do that. 
It is rather that the properties are “commendatory,” which is to say that they 
have a certain power: the power to make us commend when we merely attrib-
ute one to something.
I don’t mean “make” in a causal sense, as when a parent, concerned with 
politeness, makes his child commend a friend, or when a red object makes us 
experience a sensation of red. The relationship is rather a constitutive one. In 
attributing a normative property, we thereby commend. To use terminology 
J. L. Austin (1962) introduced, it is an illocutionary rather than a perlocution-
ary act. This makes it plausible that this power to commend and condemn 
gives us some insight into the nature of the underlying normative property. If 
the relation were merely causal, then, since “anything can cause anything,” we 
couldn’t claim that the commending gave us any insight into the property’s 
intrinsic nature. But since the relation is a much stronger relation—indeed, an 
internal relation—we can plausibly claim this.
Speech act theorists have developed other categories and distinctions to help 
us understand their object of study. One is the distinction between direct and 
indirect speech acts. In saying, “I have a car,” in the earlier example, I was, 
directly, making a description, and, indirectly, making an oﬀer. Suppose I say, 
“Martin is a good man.” On my view (as well as most others), I am making a 
description. On my view (as well as most others), I am also thereby making a 
commendation. But what is the status, on my view, of this commendation? Is 
it a direct or an indirect speech act?
Typically, and perhaps even in all other cases, whether a person has per-
formed an indirect speech act (in addition to whatever direct speech act she 
has performed) is not settled by the semantic content of the utterance, or by 
“what is said.” Additional conventions, intentions, and knowledge of these by 
the parties involved may be required.5 I am claiming that no such background 
5 According to Searle:
In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually 
says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic 
and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the 
part of the hearer.
(1979: 31–2)
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conventions, intentions, and knowledge are required to turn a normative asser-
tion into a commendation or criticism. I am suggesting that it is settled—with 
an important possible exception to be accommodated shortly—by the seman-
tic content of the assertion. It is because the speaker is saying that a certain 
thing has a certain normative property that she is now, whether she intends to 
or not, commending or condemning the thing.
For this reason, perhaps we should say that the act of commending or con-
demning that a person performs in attributing a normative property is direct 
rather than indirect. It is certainly “less indirect” than stock cases of indirect 
speech acts, which involve mediation by the extra-semantic phenomena. On 
the other hand, the view says that in attributing a normative property, we 
thereby commend. The commendation is parasitic on the description, and is 
explained by it. Thus the commendation is “less direct” than the description.
Does it matter what the answer is here, and, more generally, how well 
the phenomenon I am postulating fits into accepted speech-act-theoretic 
categories? I suppose it would be nice if there were recognized cases that 
behaved like the phenomenon I am postulating, but I’m not sure it matters 
much. I don’t think it should be much of a surprise if the phenomenon pos-
tulated here turns out to be unusual, or even unique. It is invoked to explain 
something unusual, and indeed unique. And granting that the thesis is con-
troversial and novel, we should not have expected speech act theorists to 
have used the phenomenon it postulates to guide the construction of their 
theories. The issue of the oddness of the phenomenon will come up later 
when it comes to explaining how it can be used to account for the queerness 
of irreducible normativity.
None of this is to aﬃrm that our phenomenon (of commending due to 
the content of an assertion) can occur wholly absent any of the contextual 
features required for ordinary speech acts to occur. For one thing, in order 
simply for a description to occur certain conditions must obtain (e.g., cer-
tain beliefs and intentions may need to be present in the speaker). And of 
course for our words to have the meanings they do requires all manner of 
conditions. What is being claimed here is that, once we have whatever is 
required for a person to be performing the speech act of genuinely describ-
ing something as having a normative property, nothing else is required for 
According to Green:
Whether, in addition to a given speech act, I am also performing an indirect speech act 
would seem to depend on my intentions … What is more, these intentions must be fea-
sibly discernible on the part of one’s audience. Even if, in remarking on the fine weather, 
I intend as well to request that you pass the salt, I have not done so. I need to make that 
intention manifest in some way.
(2009: §3.4)
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the further speech act of commendation to occur; rather, what explains why 
the further speech act occurs is the nature of the property attributed.
9.2.1 Contrast with Motivational Judgment Internalism
The view of normative properties as necessarily commending properties 
should not be confused with any form of motivational judgment internal-
ism, the view that normative judgment entails motivational pro-attitudes 
of some kind on the part of the judger (at least for some class of judgers). 
It is no part of the view here that when one asserts, say, that one ought 
to do some act available to one, and thereby, according to the hypothesis, 
commends one’s doing it, one must have some motivation to do it, or any 
kind of favorable non-cognitive attitude towards the act at all. A person can 
commend something even when he has no such attitudes, just as a person 
can thank someone or apologize to someone even when the person doesn’t 
feel at all thankful or apologetic.
It is worth spelling out this comparison further. We can distinguish dif-
ferent grades of these speech acts. Consider apology. There is fully insin-
cere apology, as when someone is being sarcastic. No apology occurs there. 
Among genuine apologies, we can distinguish at least two kinds. There are 
high-grade apologies, in which the apologizer feels genuine remorse. This is 
the best kind of apology. But there is a lower-grade variety as well, in which 
there are no feelings of remorse, but a genuine apology still occurs. Suppose 
I wrong you. I feel guilty about it initially, but, as happens, these feelings 
subside. Although I can no longer muster any emotions or disfavorable atti-
tudes about the incident, I still know that what I did was wrong, and this 
prompts me to say to you, “I apologize for doing that.” I have apologized 
to you, despite lacking the attitudes or feelings that might make it an ideal 
apology.6
6 Cf. Austin (1962: 10):
It is gratifying to observe … how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves 
the way for immodality. For one who says ‘promising is not merely a matter of uttering 
words! It is an inward and spiritual act!’ is apt to appear as a solid moralist standing out 
against a generation of superficial theorizers: we see him as he sees himself, surveying the 
invisible depths of ethical space, with all the distinction of a specialist in the sui generis. 
Yet he provides Hippolytus with a let-out, the bigamist with an excuse for his ‘I do’ and 
the welsher with a defense for his ‘I bet’. Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of 
the plain saying that our word is our bond.
I’m not sure whether Austin would call the apology described above “insincere,” but 
it is pretty clear that he would not deny that I have apologized; the apology is not, in his 
terminology, “void.” See Austin (1962: 40).
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Something similar seems true of normative utterance. A person who sin-
cerely attributes a normative property to something—they are not being 
sarcastic, they really think the thing has this feature—thereby commends or 
condemns it. If he lacks appropriate motivational states or attitudes towards 
the thing, this may mean that something less than ideal is going on. Perhaps 
whenever we genuinely believe, say, that some act was wrong, we should 
have a disfavorable attitude towards it. But if things aren’t ideal, and we lack 
the attitude (perhaps we are callous, or tired, or under heavy sedation), but 
still believe that the act was wrong, and so describe it as such, a genuine 
condemnation has still occurred.7
Thus the view defended here is no form of motivational judgment inter-
nalism.8 Later (section 9.4.3), I indicate how the view can get us what moti-
vational judgment internalism has often been relied upon to deliver: an 
account of the “essential practicality” of normativity.
9.2.2 Comparison with Hybrid Theories
The idea that making a normative utterance inherently involves an act of 
commending or condemning is often associated with non-cognitivism. 
R. M. Hare claims that “the primary function of the word ‘good’ is to com-
mend” (1952: 127). But, as a theory about the nature of normative proper-
ties and facts, the view here is not a kind of non-cognitivism. More popular 
these days than pure non-cognitivist theories, however, may be hybrids of 
these with cognitivist theories. I arrived at the view here through a problem 
in normative metaphysics: the problem of the nature of irreducibly nor-
mative properties. But the view turns out to have implications concerning 
whether a “hybrid theory” in metaethics is true. The view is in fact a kind of 
hybrid theory, though of a less-discussed variety.
To begin, we should distinguish theses about normative thought, or judg-
ment, from theses about normative utterance. The former tell us what kind 
of mental states normative judgments are; the latter tell us what we are doing 
when we make normative utterances. According to cognitivist theories of 
normative judgment, normative judgments are cognitive states—in particu-
lar, beliefs. According to non-cognitivist theories, they are non-cognitive 
7 Copp (2009: 173–4) aﬃrms a similar view.
8 Thomson (2008: 54) similarly dissociates speech acts like commending from the 
having of positive attitudes:
it is one thing to perform the speech act of praising a thing and quite another to have any 
thing that would ordinarily be regarded as a favorable attitude towards the thing praised.
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states, such as desires. According to hybrid theories of normative judgment, 
normative judgments are composite states consisting of both.
One way to characterize normative utterances is in terms of the mental 
states they are thought to express. Thus, one kind of hybridism about nor-
mative utterance is the view that a declarative normative utterance expresses 
both a cognitive and a non-cognitive state. But we can also characterize 
normative utterances behaviorally rather than psychologically—that is, in 
terms of which kinds of speech act they are instances of rather than accord-
ing to which kinds of mental state they express. According to one such view, 
declarative normative utterances are assertions or descriptions, and nothing 
more. We can call this descriptivism about normative utterance. The oppo-
site view, non-descriptivism, is the view that grammatically declarative nor-
mative utterances are not in the business of describing reality, and instead 
do something such as prescribe or commend.
The theory defended here about the nature of normative properties 
attempts to get at their nature by advancing a thesis about what we are 
doing when we attribute normative properties to things, that is, when we 
make declarative normative utterances. Thus, while it has no direct implica-
tions regarding normative judgment or thought, it does have direct implica-
tions regarding normative utterance. The view is a version of a less-discussed 
form of hybridism about normative utterance: a hybrid of what I have 
called descriptivism and non-descriptivism. For it holds that declarative 
normative utterances necessarily do something descriptive—they attribute 
normative properties to things—and something non-descriptive—they 
commend or condemn. Unlike on some other forms of hybridism, the 
non-descriptive and descriptive elements are necessarily connected on my 
view, in that making a normative description entails making a commenda-
tion or condemnation.9
Often hybrid theories in metaethics have naturalistic motivations, such 
as to inject normativity, or something like it, into a naturalistic realist meta-
ethic. But the view defended here is motivated instead by a desire to be able 
to explain, to some extent, what normativity might be if it is non-natural 
and irreducible. Thus more common forms of hybridism and my view 
begin from quite diﬀerent motivations, even if we end up in similar places.10
9 For reasons I lack the space to explain, this enables the theory to avoid some prob-
lems faced by other hybrid theories, such as, for example, the one discussed in Schroeder 
(2009: 268–71).
10 What about normative thought? One view that fits naturally is that whenever we 
believe that something has a normative property, we engage in something like a private 
mental act of commendation (if there are such things). Other intriguing ideas that I wish 
I could explore here are (i) that of explaining why having a normative belief entails mak-
ing a commendation by appeal to the idea that a belief counts as a normative belief only 
if it is also a commendation; (ii) a related thesis about concept mastery that a person 
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9.2.3 Why “Commending” and “Condemning”?
I state the thesis using the somewhat archaic language of “commending” 
and “condemning.” Why these terms?
One way to put the guiding thought of the theory is that attributions of 
normative properties involve us in a kind of practice. One way to character-
ize the practice is as one of evaluation. This term, however, can make the 
theory sound vacuous, as the theory can then be put as the view that evalu-
ative properties are properties the attributions of which are evaluations. And 
there may be a temptation to hold that evaluations themselves are simply 
attributions of evaluative properties. I’m not sure the temptation to char-
acterize evaluation in this way is justified, but we can sidestep the issue by 
choosing a diﬀerent practice, or at least a diﬀerent term. Thus, I’m looking 
for a term that stands for a practice that can occur in contexts other than 
the attribution of normative properties. In this way it would be a practice 
that we have some independent familiarity with and grasp of. Since the 
theory is supposed to shed some light on the nature of normative proper-
ties, it is helpful if our understanding of the phenomenon that is acting as 
the explanans not be wholly parasitic on the phenomenon it is called into 
service to elucidate.11
I would also like to find terms that can cover all the diﬀerent kinds of 
(thin) normative properties that we attribute: a term that covers evalua-
tive properties, as in “It’s good to be loved,” along with narrowly norma-
tive properties, as in, “You ought to go”; a term that covers attributions to 
objects in diﬀerent ontological categories, such as actions, states of aﬀairs, 
propositions, and people; a term that covers mild as well as severe normative 
strengths; and a term that covers non-verdictive—that is, prima facie or pro 
tanto—normative judgments.
“Commend” and “condemn” do this reasonably well, though perhaps 
not perfectly. “Commend” is quite natural for evaluative statements. As 
Hare notes, the OED characterizes “good” as “the most general adjective of 
commendation” (1952: 79). “Commend” is less natural for narrowly nor-
mative statements. If I say, “you ought to go,” it would be more natural to 
say that I am recommending that you go rather than that I am commending 
your going. But I think that if we think about it, we will agree that we are 
commending something whenever we are recommending it. We are prais-
ing it, applauding it, taking our hat oﬀ to it, giving it a thumbs up.
qualifies as grasping some normative concept only if he is capable of engaging in these 
mental commendings; and (iii) to what extent this can help non-naturalism explain nor-
mative concept acquisition.
11 I return to this in section 9.3.2.
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“Condemn” brings with it an additional complication. It may not be 
quite the opposite of “commend,” since it may imply a certain severity of 
criticism.12 It is also not clear that it can correspond to non-verdictive judg-
ments. I therefore choose “condemn” with the conditional proviso that if in 
fact “condemn” does not properly apply to the attribution of milder norma-
tive properties (such as in, “He has some reason not to want that”), then 
I stipulate a wider sense for it, for the purposes of the theory, a sense that 
makes “condemn” the literal opposite of “commend.”13
Although “commending” and “condemning” seem to me to do a well 
enough job at filling these bills, I am not wedded to them. What I am wed-
ded to is explaining the nature of normative facts by appeal to the speech 
acts, beyond description, that asserting these facts necessarily involves us in. 
If it turns out that “commending” and “condemning” are not adequate, I’m 
hopeful either that some other terms are better, or that we can understand 
the phenomenon I have in mind well enough—especially in light of the 
present discussion—even if no term of English happens to be just right 
for it.
9.2.4 Refining the Thesis
So far we have been working with the “basic idea” of the theory. We can put 
that as follows, giving it a name now:
NP1: Normative properties are those such that, to attribute one to 
something is, due to the nature of the property, necessarily to com-
mend or condemn that thing.
Note that this amounts to a necessary and suﬃcient condition—being 
essentially commendatory is both necessary and suﬃcient for being a nor-
mative property (some earlier formulations may have suggested only the 
necessary condition). This basic idea faces some potential counterexamples.
9.2.4.1 Unknowing Attributions of Normative Properties
Suppose your favorite property is, appropriately enough, intrinsic good-
ness, although I don’t know this. You tell me that a certain thing has your 
favorite property. I report this to a third party, though, again, I don’t know 
what property I am attributing. In reporting this to the third party, have 
12 Thanks to Guy Fletcher here.
13 Thomson (2008: 54, 77) uses the unfamiliar term “dispraise” to describe what we 
are doing when we call something bad. This term might, for my purposes, work just as 
well as “condemn.”
Chris Heathwood228
I attributed intrinsic goodness to the thing? It would seem so. Have I com-
mended this thing? Not obviously so.
Since perhaps it is also not obvious that I have not commended the 
thing (there is independent reason to think that we can commend without 
knowing it), consider another example. Suppose there is a race of rational 
creatures spying on us from another planet. They become interested in 
a certain use of our word “good” (when it is used to attribute intrinsic 
goodness to things). They have no idea what the word means or what 
phenomenon it signifies, but they are able to see that it is a predicate, and 
thus suspect that it stands for some property. A whimsical member of their 
community proposes that they incorporate this meaning of “good” into 
their language, with the stipulation that whenever one of them applies it 
to something, one attributes to this thing the same property, whatever it 
is, that we humans are attributing when we apply it to something.14 Next, 
suppose that after some time, certain confused members of this alien race 
begin to believe that they have some insight into the nature of the property 
this word expresses, and so begin genuinely to believe, of certain things, 
that these things have this property. When they say that certain things 
have the property, they would seem to be attributing intrinsic goodness 
to it. But when they do this, are they thereby commending these things? 
The pull to answer “No” in this case of community-wide ignorance may 
be made even stronger if we stipulate that these aliens themselves have 
no conception of value and, further, have no practice of commending or 
condemning (although some may wonder whether these additional stipu-
lations make for a genuinely possible case).
This example might refute NP1. But I don’t believe it calls for wholesale 
abandonment of its general idea. Rather, we can use the insight the example 
provides to devise a better formulation of the general idea. Consider
NP2: Normative properties are those such that, to attribute one 
knowingly to something is, due to the nature of the property know-
ingly attributed, necessarily to commend or condemn that thing.
In order to attribute a property knowingly to something, one has to know 
which property one is attributing. This requires some degree of grasp of 
the property. If you don’t “get” normative reasons or intrinsic value, you 
can still attribute them to things, by using words learned from others who 
do get it. One can “latch onto” these properties without understanding 
them, as the aliens did in the example above, but one cannot attribute them 
knowingly to things without understanding them. I set aside the question 
of just what level of understanding of the property is required, other than 
14 This example is similar to a case in Eklund (2013: §3).
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to say that we probably don’t want to require perfect grasp—perhaps that 
never happens—and likewise don’t want the requirement to be so lax that 
the attributors in the cases above count as grasping.
NP2 is very much of a piece with NP1. The basic idea of my view is that 
normative properties get us into the business of performing certain speech 
acts. But of course they don’t do this completely on their own. We need to 
meet them partway, by getting ourselves into a certain relation with them. 
NP1 had it that all we have to do is attribute the properties. But attribution 
is cheap, and the examples above suggest that more is required. We have to 
know what we’re attributing in order for the properties to be able to turn 
our attribution into a commendation or condemnation.15
9.2.4.2 Disjunctive and Comparative Properties
A second kind of counterexample is based on problems concerning certain 
kinds of normative properties—in particular, disjunctive normative proper-
ties and comparative normative relations.16 I group them together because 
they may admit of a single solution.
Consider this remark: “This is either good or bad, though I don’t know 
which.” Maybe no attribution of a normative property takes place here; 
perhaps that happens only when the speaker takes a stand as to which 
it is, good or bad. If so, then there is no counterexample. But it’s also 
possible that there are disjunctive properties, and, further, that a disjunc-
tive property each of whose disjuncts is a normative property is itself a 
normative property. If so, then the speaker of this remark does knowingly 
attribute a normative property, the property of being either good or bad. 
But it doesn’t seem that the speaker is either commending or condemning 
anything.
Being built up out of other normative properties, disjunctive normative 
properties are non-basic. The simplest solution is thus to restrict the thesis 
to one about basic normative properties, as follows:
NP3: Basic normative properties are those such that, to attribute one 
knowingly to something is, due to the nature of the property know-
ingly attributed, necessarily to commend or condemn that thing.
15 An alternative possible way to deal with such cases—though perhaps it amounts 
to the same view in the end—is to require that the property be attributed directly, as 
discussed in Roberts (2013). The problem cases above would be cases of indirect property 
attribution.
16 The problem concerning disjunctive normative properties was brought to my atten-
tion by Matt Chrisman. Several audience members, including Noah Lemos, have raised 
the worry about comparative judgments.
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Since being either good or bad is not a basic normative property, NP3 
avoids the implication that saying, “This is either good or bad, though 
I don’t know which,” is to commend or condemn something. Nor does 
NP3 leave the nature of these non-basic normative properties mysteri-
ous, since non-basic normative properties are, by definition, analyzable 
in terms of the basic normative properties, properties whose nature NP3 
elucidates.
Next consider comparative normative judgments, such as that it’s bet-
ter to suﬀer a paper cut than a migraine. To state this fact may not be to 
attribute a normative property to something, but surely the normative 
relation attributed is something that the general approach here should 
want to shed light on. One plausible way for the theory to do this is to 
assimilate the case of these comparative normative assertions to the dis-
junctive case above, and hold that comparative normative relations—such 
as in our example above—are non-basic, and reducible to absolute, 
non-comparative, normative properties. This approach requires no revi-
sion to NP3.
To illustrate, we might say that “x is intrinsically better than y” means 
that x has a certain intrinsic value, n; y has a certain intrinsic value, m; and n 
is greater than m (where “n” and “m” range over real numbers). Claims such 
as that x has an intrinsic value of n will correspond to commendations when 
n is positive and condemnations when n is negative. (When n is zero—that 
is, when we say that something has no intrinsic value—no normative prop-
erty is attributed.)
Another promising strategy is to hold that such utterances involve speech 
acts that are the comparative analogs to commending and condemning. 
Thus, to say that it’s better to suﬀer a paper cut than a migraine is to com-
mend paper cuts relative to migraines (it may also be to condemn migraines 
relative to paper cuts). Judith Thomson accepts a view like this about bet-
terness relations. She holds that when we say, “Smith is a better chess player 
than Jones,” we praise Smith “relative to Jones” (2008: 61).17
17 Another potentially problematic case is that of rights claims (thanks to Daniel 
Wodak for raising this point). The claim that fetuses have a right to life is surely a norma-
tive claim. Are we commending fetuses when we say this? Maybe. Note that, instead of 
saying that fetuses have rights, some people mean to convey more or less the same idea by 
saying that fetuses have intrinsic value, and this claim seems commendatory. Note also 
that we seem to be positively evaluating fetuses if we claim that they have rights, and so 
we are engaging in the kind of speech act I am ultimately after here (even if “commend-
ing” isn’t a perfect word for it (see section 9.2.3)). A final point here is that rights claims 
may be equivalent to certain claims about obligations. If so, then the fact that some being 
has a certain right just is the fact that it is wrong to treat this being in certain ways; and 
wrongness is straightforwardly covered by the theory.
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9.3 THREE OBJECTIONS
9.3.1 Commending the Bad
Having presented and refined the theory of normative properties as 
essentially commendatory properties, I would now like to address three 
important objections. The first is similar to a familiar concern for both 
non-cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism. Imagine a cadre 
of devils interested in discovering what would we be bad precisely to do it. 
One devil says to another, “I recommend that you do this, since it would 
be very bad indeed.” My theory commits me to saying that, in attributing 
badness to this act, the devil is condemning it.18 But in fact he is attributing 
badness to it precisely to commend it.
A familiar response to this kind of case maintains that the devil isn’t really 
saying that the act would be bad to do, but is instead using an “inverted 
commas” or “scare quotes” sense of “bad” (Hare 1952: 124–5; Smith 
1994: §§3.3–3.4). According to this idea, the devil doesn’t really judge that 
the act in question would be bad—he’s recommending it after all. What he 
is really saying is something like this: “I recommend that you do this, since 
it would be what most people call ‘very bad’.” Since such a remark does not 
involve the devil in attributing actual badness to anything, if this is what his 
original remark really means, it would be no counterexample to the theory.
The “inverted commas reply” is an interesting strategy for non-cognitivists 
and motivational judgment internalists, but it is a non-starter for normative 
realists who want to accept the view of normative properties as essentially 
commendatory. Non-cognitivists don’t believe in normative properties.19 
Their account of normativity locates it in our language and thought rather 
than in the world. But my theory is for those who believe in properties that 
are themselves normative. If these properties are real, they are there for the 
devil to learn about, and knowingly attribute to things. And that is just 
what he has done in the example.
Nonetheless, I don’t believe that the objection ultimately succeeds. A 
plausible case can be made for the view that the devil is in fact condemn-
ing the action he knows is bad. We can begin by noting that any asser-
tion, whether in language naturalistic or normative, can be used to perform 
18 The theory as formulated (NP3 above) doesn’t strictly speaking imply this. To gen-
erate the implication, we need to make explicit what was surely already implicit: that to 
attribute positive normative properties is to commend and to attribute negative normative 
properties is to condemn.
19 I cannot discuss the alleged possibility that non-cognitivists might believe in nor-
mative properties and facts.
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almost any kind of speech act, given the right conventions and context. In 
particular, if you know that your audience is interested in finding some-
thing with a certain feature, you can commend or recommend to them 
something simply by pointing out that it has this feature. This holds even if 
the feature is badness. But the theory of normative properties as essentially 
commendatory is compatible with this. The theory describes one way that 
we can commend or condemn, but allows for all manner of other ways that 
this can occur, such as the way just described. Thus, while it is obvious that, 
in pointing out that the act is bad, the devil is thereby recommending it, 
this fact is in no tension with the theory. What is incompatible with the 
theory is the claim that, in pointing out that the act is bad, the devil is not 
also thereby condemning it. The objection may be implicitly assuming that 
if one is commending something by describing it in a certain way, one can-
not also be condemning it by describing it in that way. But such an infer-
ence has not been justified.
So instead of deriving as a lemma the claim that the devil is not con-
demning the act by pointing out that it is bad, the objection must just 
assert this as a premise. Against this, the theory of normative properties as 
essentially commendatory must maintain that the devil involves himself in 
a kind of conflict of speech acts. On the one hand, he is recommending the 
act in calling it bad, since his audience is interested in finding an act that 
would be bad to do. On the other hand, he is also condemning the act, 
since he has said sincerely that it would be bad to do.
My defense of the idea that the devil is in fact condemning the act has 
two parts, one negative, one positive. The negative part exposes a poor rea-
son for thinking that the devil is not condemning the act. According to this 
thought, the devil must not be condemning the act in question because 
the devil has no disfavorable attitudes towards it. But, as discussed earlier, 
a person can genuinely commend or condemn without having the corre-
sponding attitudes, just as a person can genuinely apologize even if he’s 
unable to feel remorse. Sympathy for the devil objection may be rooted in 
this mistaken view of commending and condemning.
More positively, there are reasons to think that the devil is in fact con-
demning the act in pointing out that it would be bad to do. Here is a 
simple argument for this. To say that an act would be bad to do is to say 
something bad about it. To say something bad about an act is to (verbally) 
evaluate it negatively. To (verbally) evaluate an act negatively is to condemn 
it.20 These intuitively plausible principles imply that the devil has indeed 
20 I include the term “verbally” because it is possible to negatively evaluate an act just 
in thought, and it’s not clear whether this is a kind of condemnation. See footnote 10.
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condemned the act that he has said would be bad to do. Note that this 
argument does not presuppose my theory. Those who reject the theory 
of normative properties as essentially commending properties can accept 
the argument. Consider, for example, the view that it is nothing about the 
property of badness itself that makes attributions of it condemnations, but 
something about our mode of representing or expressing this property that 
makes attributions of it condemnations (the common analogy with slurs is 
helpful here). This naturalist-friendly theory can agree with the plausible 
idea that to say that an act would be bad to do is to say something bad about 
it, to evaluative it negatively, and to condemn it.
Finally, it may be helpful to note that similar speech act conflicts occur in 
other contexts. Judith Thomson, who defends views about attributions of 
goodness that are in some ways similar to mine, gives the following example:
We have to grant in any case that it is possible to both praise and dispraise a person 
in saying some words about him. If I am a professor of mathematics, and my letter 
of recommendation for my graduate student for a teaching position at Greatorex 
University consisted entirely of the words “He is good at doing arithmetic,” then 
I have both praised and dispraised the student. I have praised him, since writing “He 
is good at doing arithmetic” is praising him. But the context in which I wrote those 
words makes it the case that I also dispraised him.
(Thomson 2008: 56)
Similarly, the devil has both praised and dispraised the act. The devil dis-
praised it, since saying, “It would be very bad” is dispraising it. But the con-
text in which he said those words makes it the case that he also praised it.
9.3.2 An Unhelpful Tautology
According to another objection, the theory of normative properties as 
essentially commendatory sheds no light on normativity, as it is supposed to 
do, because it is covertly tautologous. It is covertly tautologous because the 
best account of what it is to commend something is that it is to attribute a 
positive normative property to it. My view would thus ultimately be saying 
no more than that the normative properties are those such that when you 
attribute one to something, you can’t help but be attributing a normative 
property to it.
But the account of commending on which this objection relies is doubt-
ful. For we often commend without attributing normative or evaluative 
properties to things. I might commend a bicycle simply by pointing out that 
it is made of carbon, but being made of carbon is not a normative property. 
And we can commend without attributing a property at all. When someone 
says, “I commend you for your eﬀorts,” they are, as Austin would say, not 
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reporting on a commendation, but indulging in one (Austin 1962: 5). We 
can also commend by giving a thumbs-up or a high-five. A ballplayer might 
commend his teammate out of habit by giving him a high-five without hav-
ing come to the view that the teammate did anything good.
These cases might be dealt with by understanding or formulating the 
target theory of commendation in a less restrictive way. The account could 
hold that to commend is to attribute a normative property either explicitly 
or implicitly.21 Perhaps all the cases I cite above are cases of implicit nor-
mative property attribution. I have doubts about that, but I don’t think 
it matters, since another case shows pretty clearly that one can commend 
without even implicitly attributing a normative property. This is the case of 
the committed normative nihilist. We can imagine such a person engaging 
in the business of commending while simultaneously making her nihilism 
conspicuous. Upon receiving a request for advice, she might say this:
“As you know, I’m a normative nihilist: I don’t believe that anything has any norma-
tive properties. And so in particular, I don’t believe that there is anything that you 
ought to do. Nonetheless, I’m happy to give you some advice: I recommend that 
you donate $20.”
The nihilist is commending a certain course of action, but she appears to 
have succeeded in refraining from attributing any normative properties to 
it, even implicitly.
9.3.3 Might Some Natural Property Be Essentially 
Commendatory?
Our final objection targets the suﬃciency claim of the theory. NP3 says 
that being essentially commendatory is both necessary and suﬃcient for 
being a basic, irreducibly normative property. But might some natural, 
non-normative property also be essentially commendatory, in conflict 
with NP3?
It of course won’t do to find some property that plays this role contin-
gently, as many natural properties do on account of our interests or conven-
tions. But might some natural property, presumably one that is intimately 
related to the very phenomenon of commendation itself, be essentially such 
as to play this role? I have claimed, and indeed relied upon the fact, that 
commendation is a natural phenomenon. So let “N” stand for a natural 
property—perhaps a rather complex one—the instantiation of which is suf-
ficient for a commendation to occur. Might this property be what we are 
21 I am grateful to Gunnar Björnsson here.
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looking for: one such that, to attribute it to something is, due to the prop-
erty’s nature, necessarily to commend that thing?22
No, for there is a diﬀerence between a property (i) being such that if it 
obtains, a commendation has occurred, and (ii) being such that if someone 
attributes it to something, a commendation has occurred. (i) is true of N, 
but the objection requires a property of which (ii) is true. To illustrate, the 
state of aﬀairs involving the nihilist saying, “I recommend that you donate 
$20,” is suﬃcient for a commendation to occur. But my reporting this 
natural fact—my saying, “The nihilist said, ‘I recommend that you donate 
$20,’ ”—is not itself to commend or recommend anything. Whatever natu-
ral property I attribute in stating this natural fact, while it is a natural prop-
erty the instantiation of which is suﬃcient for a commendation to occur, 
is not a natural property such that, to attribute it to something is itself to 
make a commendation.
The objector here is looking for a natural fact such that merely stating 
this fact is suﬃcient for a commendation to occur. What about the nihil-
ist’s utterance itself: “I recommend that you donate $20”? Making such 
utterances is suﬃcient for making a commendation. However, these “per-
formatives” are not the reportings of facts; they are not true or false (Austin 
1962: 6). Since no property is attributed, a fortiori no essentially commend-
atory natural property is attributed.
But perhaps some variation on the canonical performative form will pro-
vide an example of a kind of utterance that is at once descriptive and essen-
tially commendatory. If I say, “I commend you for your eﬀorts,” or simply,
(C1) “I commend you,”
I have not described my commending you; I have done it. This is like the 
nihilist’s performative. But suppose I say,
(C2) “You are hereby commended.”
(C2) is certainly a commendation, at least ordinarily, just as an utterance 
of, “You are hereby warned not to come closer,” is a warning. But is (C2) 
also a description, and hence a property attribution, where the property in 
question is the property of being commended?
I find this hard to decide. (C2) may be just another way of saying (C1), 
in which case it, too, would not be true or false. On the other hand, its 
grammatical form seems rather descriptive, for it is identical in form to the 
following:
22 For ease of presentation in what follows, I omit the qualification that the attribution 
must be knowing.
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(S2) “You are hereby spoken to.”
This remark, however, is grammatically odd—it sounds like a funny hybrid 
of a performative and a description. We may therefore not want to draw any 
conclusions from it. We can repair it, however, as follows:
(S3) “You are hereby being spoken to.”
(S3) is perfectly grammatical, and, when uttered to someone, is always 
true. It is thus a description. So let’s consider its potentially-commendatory 
cousin:
(C3) “You are hereby being commended.”
(C3) is as clear a case of a description as (S3). But is (C3) true, whenever it 
is sincerely spoken to someone? That is, must a sincere utterance of (C3) be 
a commendation, just as a sincere utterance of (C1) is always a commen-
dation? I think this is also hard to decide. Must we be thanking someone 
anytime we sincerely tell him, “You are hereby being thanked”? Is that even 
ever a thanking? How would you feel if that was the thanks you got?
Even if we decide that any sincere utterance of (C3) must be a com-
mendation, the objection to NP3 faces another problem, this one more 
decisive. The objection aims to show that a certain natural property, the 
one attributed in (C3), is essentially commendatory. What property is this? 
One natural thought is that it is a certain relation, the relation that obtains 
between an utterer, an utterance, and an utteree just in case the utterer is 
commending the utteree by means of the utterance. Call this relation “C.” 
The problem is this: not all attributions of C are commendations, and thus 
C is not essentially commendatory. That not all attributions of C are com-
mendations is shown by the fact that one can attribute C to someone else, as 
in, “Look over there: Mabel is commending Abel by means of the utterance 
she is making.”23
A natural rejoinder to this reply is to hold that the indexical elements in 
(C3) are essential to its being a commendation. The objector could thus 
hold that whenever I say to someone,
(C3) “You are hereby being commended,”
I am self-attributing C, and it is self-attributions of C that are essentially 
commendatory. That might be true, but this doesn’t refute NP3, which 
says nothing about self-attributions. To self-attribute natural property C 
23 Strictly speaking, I should say that one can attribute C, not to someone else, but 
to a certain set of things, perhaps an ordered triple, consisting of utterer, utterance, and 
utteree.
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may necessarily be to make a commendation, but refuting NP3 requires 
finding a property such that merely attributing it is necessarily to make a 
commendation.24
When I was first thinking about this problem for NP3,25 I suspected 
that we very well might find a case of an essentially commendatory natural 
property. I was thinking that the theory would then need to be weakened 
to a mere necessary condition. A weakened theory would still, I believe, 
reveal an interesting and substantive facet of the essence of irreducible 
normativity—even if a certain natural property shared this facet, too. Such 
a theory would also still distinguish normative properties from other puta-
tively non-natural properties—such as modal, mathematical, and logical 
properties—since none of these is a candidate for being essentially com-
mendatory. It would have had the drawback that some of the claims in 
the next section, about further work the theory can do, would have to be 
qualified. But, in the final analysis, no such qualifications seem necessary. 
It seems that no natural property is such that, to attribute it to something 
is, due to the nature of the property, necessarily to commend or condemn 
that thing.26
24 To avoid testing the reader’s patience, I have spoken somewhat loosely here. In 
uttering (C3), I am not strictly speaking self-attributing C, but rather putting myself in 
the “utterer slot” of C, my listener in the “utteree slot,” and (C3) itself in the “utterance 
slot.” This isn’t self-attribution because the relation is attributed to a group—perhaps 
an ordered triple—of people and things, of which I am a member. We might call this 
“us-attribution.” But whatever we call it, the problem remains: we may have succeeded 
in finding a natural property such that anyone who “us-attributes” it to a certain ordered 
triple thereby commends a certain member of that triple, but this is no counterexample 
to NP3, which says nothing about us-attribution.
25 Versions of which have been suggested by Justin D’Arms, Mike Ridge, Brian 
Tackett, and Mark Heller.
26 Two final points. First, if non-reductive naturalism is true, there very well might be 
natural properties that are essentially commendatory, namely, the normative properties 
(which, on this view, are natural properties). (I say “might” because it isn’t certain: it 
may require that these properties be essentially inexpressible in non-normative terms, 
something that in fact strikes me as doubtful.) But I believe this possibility is dialecti-
cally irrelevant. My project is (mainly) to assume non-naturalism, and then defend an 
account of the nature of irreducible normativity. So I am taking it for granted in this 
section that non-reductive naturalism is false. (And note, for what it’s worth, that even 
if non-reductive naturalism is true, there is still an apparently true thesis that corre-
sponds to my thesis in this section, namely, that no non-normative property is essentially 
commendatory.)
Second, and relatedly, one might be tempted by the thought that if reductive natu-
ralism is true, then there will be a natural property that is necessarily commendatory, 
namely, the natural property that, according to the true form of reductive naturalism, is 
identical to a certain basic normative property. In reply to this, I repeat the point about 
dialectical irrelevance. But I also note that it doesn’t even seem true. If we attribute this 
property under its naturalistic guise, or using naturalistic vocabulary, it is not plausible 
to think that such attributions must always be commendations. Even if pleasantness is 
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9.4 FURTHER WORK THE HYPOTHESIS CAN DO
The view of normative properties as essentially commendatory not only helps 
non-naturalists explain the nature of these properties, it does further interest-
ing work as well: (a) it provides for an account of the “queerness” of normative 
properties, one superior to other accounts; (b) it explains why reductionism 
fails, in a way friendly to non-naturalism (as opposed to non-cognitivism); 
and (c) it can help deflect arguments against non-naturalism from the 
“action-guidingness” or “essential practicality” of normativity.
9.4.1 Characterizing Queerness
The theory of irreducibly normative properties as essentially commendatory 
makes for an alternative, and I believe superior, characterization of the sense 
in which irreducibly normative properties are unusual. J. L. Mackie famously 
declares normative properties to be unacceptably “queer” (1977: 38–42). 
One central aspect of this queerness, Mackie suggests, is their power to moti-
vate anyone acquainted with them (1977: 40). Mackie is here implying that 
non-naturalists about value may be committed to some kind of motivational 
judgment internalism. But, as many point out, this isn’t so. Non-naturalists 
can, and many do, plausibly reject motivational judgment internalism.27
Nonetheless, irreducibly normative properties, if they exist, do seem to have 
some kind of “oomph” lacked by ordinary properties. In my view, it is not their 
ability to make us comply with the facts in which they figure, or to motivate 
us even slightly to do so. It is instead their ability to make anyone who merely 
attributes one knowingly to something thereby to be engaging in a practice that 
goes beyond mere description—the practice of commending or condemning. It 
does this whether the attributor wants to be doing so or not. It can indeed seem 
rather odd that simply reporting, as disinterested scientists do, that some object 
in the world has some property, can force one into the business of making an 
evaluation, but this, according to the view here, is what normative properties 
do. And this is a reasonable sense in which they are queer.
What is queer is not the notion that using normative language involves one 
in making recommendations, commendations, etc. I’m not sure any meta-
ethical view would deny that normative language can do this. What is queer is 
that, when it comes to irreducibly normative properties or facts, one can’t help 
but get oneself involved in the business of making a recommendation simply 
identical to goodness and we all know this, I still don’t believe that to describe something 
as pleasant must always be to make a commendation.
27 See, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2003: ch. 6).
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by stating a fact.28 It is that these properties are simultaneously descriptive and 
evaluative: the facts involving them simultaneously describe and evaluate the 
world, so to speak, and thus get us to engage in acts of evaluation merely by 
describing things. This account of normativity’s queerness supports Mackie’s 
contention that these properties or facts “would be entities … of a very strange 
sort, utterly diﬀerent from anything else in the universe” (Mackie 1977: 38).
It is not our business here to investigate whether irreducible normativity’s 
queerness is enough, or even any, reason to doubt its existence. I am not here 
arguing for non-naturalism but addressing an objection to it, the objection 
that non-naturalism has no plausible account of what these non-natural, 
irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be. As this section illus-
trates, the account oﬀered is an account that even those who would reject 
non-naturalism can accept, and may even welcome, as it helps underwrite an 
argument against non-naturalism: the argument from queerness. Mackie’s 
argument from queerness (or the strand of it we are focusing on here) seems 
to many to fail, because it falsely encumbers non-naturalism with some-
thing like motivational judgment internalism. If the account of queerness 
provided by my view is correct, however, opponents of non-naturalism have 
an argument from queerness that avoids at least this defect. The theory of 
normative properties as essentially commendatory may thus be something 
of a double-edged sword for non-naturalists, helping them to shed light on 
the nature of their unseen postulates, but in so doing, revealing something 
suspect about them. I don’t believe this is any reason to think that the theory 
of normative properties as essentially commendatory is mistaken, though it 
does admittedly pull against its original motivations.29
9.4.2 Explaining Why Reductionism Fails
Non-naturalists believe that attempts to reduce the normative to the natural 
are bound to fail. That is, they believe that no identification of normative 
properties or facts with properties or facts that we can express in naturalistic 
language (or any non-normative language, for that matter) can succeed. 
Why should that be?
28 The “irreducible” here is important. If reductive naturalism is true, one can 
attribute normative properties without evaluating, by attributing them under their 
naturalistic guise.
29 Michael Pendlebury rejects realism on the following grounds, and in terms that 
strike me as suggestive of the view here: “One reason why I am inclined toward normative 
expressivism is that I do not understand how a factual proposition could have the prop-
erty that anyone who is committed to it thereby takes a normative stance” (2010: 185). 
Pendlebury may be rejecting realism because it is committed to a kind of queerness not 
unlike the sort I am describing here.
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Some explanations for why reductive naturalism is bound to fail do not 
fit comfortably with non-naturalism. In the context of explaining why 
they believe that the open-question argument against reductive naturalism 
is compelling, Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton oﬀer one such explanation. 
They claim that any naturalistic reduction will seem implausible due to 
(i) the fact that “Attributions of goodness appear to have a conceptual link 
with the guidance of action,” combined with (ii) “our seeming ability to 
imagine, for any naturalistic property R, clear-headed beings who would 
fail to find appropriate reason or motive to action in the mere fact that R 
obtains (or is seen to be in the oﬃng)” (1992: 117). In other words, reduc-
tive naturalist theories are bound to fail because, while normative prop-
erties are essentially action-guiding, no natural properties are essentially 
action-guiding, where a property is essentially action-guiding just in case 
attributions of it (or, more plausibly, certain special attributions of it) neces-
sarily imply some motivation to act on the part of the attributor.
This explanation, which essentially appeals to motivational judgment 
internalism, should make non-naturalists uneasy. “For,” as Darwall, Gibbard, 
and Railton point out, “it appears no easier to see how an appropriate link 
to motivation or action could be logically secured if we were to substitute 
… ‘sui generis, simple, nonnatural property Q’ for ‘naturalistic property R’ ” 
(1992: 118). Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton conclude that non-cognitivism, 
which can straightforwardly accommodate the action-guidingness they 
posit, is “the real historical beneficiary of the open question argument,” or 
of the untenability of reductive naturalism (1992: 119).
But if non-naturalists adopt the theory of normative properties as essen-
tially commendatory properties, they can provide an alternative explana-
tion for why reductive naturalism is implausible, one that is friendlier to 
non-naturalism. Whereas Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton explain the unten-
ability of reductive naturalist theories by appeal to the alleged essential 
action-guidingness of normative properties, non-naturalists can do so by 
appealing to the essential “commendatoriness” of normative properties, a 
feature that, I have been arguing, they have reason to believe in anyway. The 
reason—or at least a reason—that normative properties can never be identi-
fied with any natural property is that, whereas normative properties are essen-
tially commendatory, no natural property is. No natural property is such that 
any possible attribution of it to something is also a commendation.30
30 This is one of the remarks that would need qualification if I am wrong that no natural 
property is essentially commendatory (see section 9.3.3). The qualification would be that 
the recherché natural property, attribution of which is suﬃcient for a commendation—the 
property I called “C” above—has no promise at all as a reduction base for normative prop-
erties. Some other claims in this section could be similarly qualified.
Irreducibly Normative Properties 241
9.4.3 An Account of the “Essential Practicality” 
of Normativity
In a more recent paper, Stephen Finlay describes another common com-
plaint against non-naturalism: “Other objections to sui generis normative 
facts and properties proceed from the thought that there is something 
essentially practical about normativity” (2010: 336). This objection is 
implicit in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton’s remark about how a prop-
erty’s being non-natural and sui generis makes it no more essentially 
action-guiding than any ordinary natural property. To indulge in some 
serious metaphor, here may be one way to put the idea of essential practi-
cality: normative claims are not simply inert, sterile descriptions of reality, 
as naturalistic claims are; normative facts have a kind of “oomph” about 
them, or perhaps a kind of “glow.” As Mackie puts it, they have a “to-be-
doneness” built into them (Mackie 1977: 40). Just what is this essential 
practicality?
As Finlay notes (2010: 336), it “has often been understood in moti-
vational terms,” and is thus often taken to require the doctrine of moti-
vational judgment internalism, a doctrine not especially friendly to 
non-naturalism. This is why the essential practicality of normative facts 
looks hard to accommodate on non-naturalism, and on realism more 
generally.
But if the theory of normative properties as essentially commendatory 
is true, non-naturalists have an alternative way to account for the essen-
tial practicality of normativity, or to deliver what motivational judgment 
internalism is often relied upon to deliver. The essential practicality of 
normative properties lies in the fact that they make those who attribute 
them knowingly to involve themselves in speech acts beyond mere attri-
bution. Normative properties’ “oomph” consists, at least in part, in the 
fact that we can’t help but commend or condemn, just by attributing 
them. Normative facts get us to do certain things—not to want to comply 
with them if we merely believe them, but to commend or condemn if we 
merely state them.
What’s more, explaining the essential practicality of normativity in 
terms of the speech acts that normative assertions involve us in rather 
than in motivational terms has independent advantages—not just for 
non-naturalists but for other realists as well. Motivational judgment inter-
nalism is quite controversial; irrespective of its implications for metaethics 
and considered on its own merits, it strikes many as empirically dubi-
ous. My explanans is, on its own merits, less doubtful. It is more plau-
sible that, in making a normative assertion, we must be commending or 
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condemning, than it is that, in making a normative judgment, we must 
have some motivation.31
9.5 CONCLUSION
My purpose has been to show that non-naturalists can answer the 
complaint that they cannot tell us what the properties they posit are 
like, other than either negatively or simply by repeating the normative 
notions. I have claimed that a certain thesis is available to them that ena-
bles them to characterize irreducible normativity positively and substan-
tively in non-normative language. I have tried to clarify and refine the 
thesis, and to defend it against objections. I have also outlined some of 
the other work I believe it can do. I hope all of this gives non-naturalists 
good reason to accept the thesis.
A certain kind of worry might be lingering: How could there be a 
property that is like this? How could there be a property such that, due 
to its special nature, knowingly attributing it to something necessarily 
constitutes commending that thing? First, note that if my view is right, 
this question really amounts to the question, How could there be nor-
mative properties? That’s a good question! Although normative facts are 
among the most familiar of facts, it is not hard to get into a frame of 
mind in which they seem astonishing, or impossible. So perhaps it is no 
surprise if my account of the nature of irreducible normativity preserves 
its strangeness, as indeed I emphasized earlier (section 9.4.1). Second, 
although I might not be able to explain how there could be essentially 
commendatory properties, it may help reduce our perplexity if we are 
persuaded that the thesis might actually be true (on the assumption that 
non-naturalism is true). If one is persuaded that the view has no clear 
counterexamples, then one agrees that anytime anyone is knowingly 
attributing an irreducibly normative property, that is suﬃcient for him 
to be making a commendation. Since the making of the commendation 
doesn’t depend on additional contingencies of context or convention, it 
must simply be a result of what one is saying about the thing one is talk-
ing about: that is, it must be something about this property. To review all 
this isn’t to explain how the view could be true, but appreciating that the 
31 Judith Thomson, who is no friend of non-naturalism, agrees. She puts the point 
in terms of favorable attitudes more generally rather than motivation in particular 
(Thomson 2008: 54). For an overview of the controversy surrounding motivational judg-
ment internalism, see Björklund et al. (2012).
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view does indeed seem true (if non-naturalism is true) may help reduce 
one’s baﬄement.32
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